Lessons Learned: A Year of RedTeaming
Field notes from our 2026 RedTeaming and DDoS engagements
RedTeaming produces two kinds of insight. One goes in the final report and belongs to the client. The other only appears when you lay a whole year of engagements side by side and ask: what was actually the same every time?
In total, our testers ran over 400 tests in 2026 (still counting), with 8 big RedTeaming-Engagements, both against networks and applications. In this article we want to talk about the patterns that repeated across this year’s engagements, and what we take from them for our own work.
Bullseye
What we mean by DDoS RedTeaming
DDoS RedTeaming approaches the target the way an attacker would:
- recon on the real attack surface
- vectors chosen from what recon turns up
- adapting mid-run as the defense responds.
A functionality test proves the paths you already know work; RedTeaming goes looking for the path you did not anticipate. Thats the real value: finding blind spots no checklist would have caught.
What we saw again and again
The technical findings differ in detail from client to client. But the underlying patterns stay the same:
The attack surface is bigger than the organization believes.
The common case isn’t the one missed open port. It’s the structural blind spot: forgotten subdomains, legacy systems with no owner, infrastructure behind load balancers that nobody tracks anymore. What’s invisible in operations shows up immediately when you measure the attack surface. And it’s trivial for an attacker to find.
APIs are the blind spot
Protection focus sits almost everywhere on what a human sees in the browser. The API endpoints behind it – often the same business logic, just without the frontend in front – are less hardened, less monitored, and almost never part of the resilience assumption. Wherever we went through the interface instead of the surface, the path was shorter.
Sideffects you cannot plan for that only shows in real attacks
A single bypass rarely stays where it lands. Slip past the CDN and the load hits the origin directly – but the origin is a CMS running as pods inside a Kubernetes cluster, so the traffic that was supposed to be absorbed at the edge now drives CPU and memory pressure across the node pool. The autoscaler reacts, or doesn’t; neighboring pods that share the cluster – unrelated services, internal tools, the API itself – degrade alongside the intended target. What started as “a web frontend under load” becomes a cluster-wide event touching systems nobody connected to the test. These chains are impossible to predict from an architecture diagram. They only show up when real load meets the real deployment, which is exactly what a diagram cannot tell you and a test can.
Review
What worked
The basics are covered, and that is the real headline. Across the vendors and setups we tested this year, the classic attack vectors – volumetric floods at Layer 3/4, the common Layer 7 patterns – were mitigated without trouble. That is not a small thing: those vectors account for the large majority of real-world DDoS traffic. Most vendors have done their homework, and most organizations running a competent provider are protected against the overwhelming majority of what they will actually face. The gaps we found live in the remaining slice – the non-obvious vectors, the second-order effects, the paths that only open once you take a closer look and use more advanced attack patterns.
Testing
Where it got interesting
Most failures come down to configuration, not capability. The majority of what we broke through was not a missing feature but a misconfigured or incomplete one. On the volumetric side that meant forgotten protocols – GRE left unfiltered, for instance – or vectors like carpet-bombing, where traffic spread thin across an entire prefix slips under per-target thresholds and lands in full on the intended host. The defense existed. It simply wasn’t set to catch what actually arrived.
A complex attack surface leaves room to bypass the defense entirely. The more sprawling the surface, the more paths exist to bypass the protection rather than defeat it. This is precisely the blind spot of a functionality test: mapping the attack surface is almost never in its scope, so the bypass route stays invisible until someone deliberately goes looking for it.
Now and then, the capability wasn’t there at all. On rare occasions we found vendors that could not defend against the more advanced attacks. Not a tuning gap but a genuine limit of what the product could do. Those cases are the exception, but they exist, and only an adversarial test surfaces them.
Bypass
What the engagements told us about our tools
Tools prove themselves in use, not on a data sheet. Three things held up in real mandates this year — and showed us, in a few places, where to sharpen.
Our own platform earned its place on both sides of that line. It handled every functionality test we needed to run without trouble – but its real value showed in the flexibility beyond that: combining attack vectors and layering in advanced patterns like low-and-slow or pulse-wave attacks, the kind of scenario a fixed playbook never reaches. We still work hard on improving UI and UX, since what works for us, might be an issue for clients who dont work with the platform on a daily basis.
Attack surface measurement was repeatedly the fastest way to confront an organization with its own reality. The JARM detector surfaced load balancer infrastructure that appeared in no documentation. And the tools we build on-thy-fly with help of AI allowed us to look deep inside networks. More on this will be released to the subscriber on our technical blog.
What we take into 2027
For us:
- bringing more DDoS Threat Intelligence into our client base: where we did it, it helped our customers to understand the whole picture.
- we keep extending the use of AI, especially when evaluating DDoS Attack Surface and translating the findings into a language out clients understand
- Extending our reach to more European organizations, thus strengthening the sovereignty of the region’s cyber landscape.
For anyone reading this who’s weighing a test of their own – three questions any organization can ask before calling us or anyone else:
Has your DDoS protection ever been tested against real world attack vectors?
Do you know your actual attack surface, including what no one still tracks in operations?
Are your API endpoints protected as well as your web interface?
What is your realistic DDoS threat level right now?
If the honest answer to any of them is „not sure,“ you already have your first result before the test.
You are under DDoS-Threat, by NoName or others?
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